Pathologies in international policy transfer: The case of the OECD tax transparency initiative
Introduction
The central role of international organizations in promoting international policy transfer and norm diffusion through the provision of discursive space and venues for sustained institutional and professional interaction is now widely recognised (Stone 2004: 555) .
However, somewhat surprisingly, given the manifold references to its prominence in policy and norm diffusion (see for example, Benson and Jordan 2011) , only recently has the OECD been subject to systematic academic scrutiny (Mahon and McBride 2008 , Woodward 2009 , Martens and Jacobi 2010 , Carroll and Kellow 2011 Pal 2012 ). In keeping with many international organizations, but unlike the other major multilateral economic institutions such as the IMF, WTO and World Bank, the OECD lacks any coercive instruments to pursue its mandate of achieving "the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living" for its members and enhancing development opportunities of nonmembers (OECD 1960) . Instead the OECD's effectiveness as an institution of global governance rests upon its ability to promote policy transfer and conformity with OECD norms through peer review and other reputation-based compliance strategies. In turn the OECD's aptitude for this rests on its reputation for technical expertise, its transgovernmental structure and linkages to member and non-member states (Mahon and McBride 2008) .
The growing recognition of the role international organizations play in knowledge dissemination has been accompanied by an appreciation of the limits of "soft law" and how this might produce policy transfer failures. First, secure in the belief that no material damage will result from non-compliance with international initiatives, scholars within the neorealist tradition highlight the existence of "sham regimes", where states commit to adopting a regulatory standard at the international level yet intentionally fail to implement it domestically (Drezner 2007) . For example, the OECD's Multilateral Agreement on 3 Investment (MAI) initiative of the late 1990s foundered upon the refusal of member states to implement agreements in order to appease powerful domestic interests (see Williams 2008) .
A second related form of policy transfer pathology results when the veto power of domestic interest groups encourages states to engage in "mock compliance" (Walter 2008 ) adopting the form but not the substance of the agreement entered, as arguably many jurisdictions did in response to the OECD's initial proposals to promote tax transparency. A third type of failed policy transfer is when states commit to and implement an international standard, either under duress, or in the hope of attracting diplomatic kudos, only to find that the regulatory framework is costly, unnecessary or hopelessly ill-suited to their domestic political circumstances. For instance, Sharman (2011) demonstrates how states possessing negligible financial centres have nevertheless sought to comply with the Financial Action Task Force's anti money laundering principles. This paper builds on this nascent literature on dysfunctional and counterproductive policy transfer by identifying and assessing a fourth type of policy transfer failure which arises when international organizations promote "sterile masterpieces" (Pal 2012: 119) , weak or lowest common denominator standards which may undermine the stated objective of the policy in question. This occurs when international organizations privilege reaching an international agreement at the expense of the effectiveness of the subsequent regime. While such outcomes are commonplace in the pragmatic cut and thrust of real world diplomacy, where international organizations such as the OECD are under pressure to deliver outcomes rather than focus on their effectiveness, we argue that the extant literature has largely ignored its potential for dysfunctional policy transfer and the processes which drive it Sharman 2009, Sharman 2010) . This is especially the case in areas such as taxation which touch upon sensitive areas of national sovereignty (Eccleston 2011). 4 The analysis which follows departs from the liberal-rationalist tradition which has come to dominate the literature on policy transfer and the assumption that developing and implementing agreed standards results in improved governance and policy success (Alderson 2001: 424, Marsh and Sharman 2009: 282) . While we acknowledge the recent critical turn in the international relations literature on policy diffusion which argues that developing countries in particular may adopt inappropriate and counterproductive policies owing to coercive pressures or the need to enhance prestige or legitimacy (Lal 2001 , Stone 2004 , Sharman 2011 , we focus on the related question of why and under what circumstances international organizations would play an active role in this process. Here the article builds on insights from Barnett and Finnemore's (2004) study of international organizations as bureaucracies and the associated claim that international organizations are agents of their own transformation. It is argued that the policy positions promoted by organizations such as the OECD cannot be established deductively but should be regarded as being the complex product of the internal culture of an organization combined with the changing interests of member states and the broader legitimacy and effectiveness of the programs they promote. Stone's (2011) theory of international organizations, with its emphasis on their need to balance great power interests and legitimacy, provides a useful framework for analysing how competing tensions shape the OECD's evolving policy agenda in relation to international taxation.
Our analysis begins with a brief critical discussion of the policy transfer literature in global governance. The article then summarises the OECD's role in developing and disseminating new international standards for tax information exchange in response to mounting concerns about the role of tax havens in facilitating international tax evasion. While this initiative has been a spectacular success in terms of promoting bi-lateral Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), the OECD's standard has attracted derision from those who believe it is 5 counterproductive because it confers legitimacy on jurisdictions which meet the standard while doing little to enhance tax transparency. The second half of the article outlines this critique and provides evidence that complying with the OECD's standard may have little impact on international tax evasion before assessing why the OECD may have been engaging in dysfunctional transfer.
The final section of the paper examines the OECD's somewhat unexpected 2012 decision to endorse new and more rigorous standards for tax information exchange. We argue that this development is significant in that it provides insights into how the policy preferences of international organizations evolve and how this impacts on the policy prescriptions and norms which they disseminate. Moreover, this case study alerts those examining the process of dysfunctional policy transfer not to be hasty in declarations of failure. The iterative nature of work at international organizations, especially the OECD, requires sensitivity to the possibility that by making incremental gains through victory in smaller, peripheral battles they are wheeling the battalions into position for victory in a longer and wider war.
Policy Transfer in Global Governance
Social scientists of all hues had long accepted the reality of policy transfer between different temporal and spatial contexts. In recent decades however, episodes of policy transfer have exploded as the revolution in information and communication technology increased the ease with which policymakers could interact. This, combined with broader debates about the extent to which economic, political and cultural integration has driven policy convergence namely the public policy literature on policy transfer and the international relations scholarship on policy diffusion. These approaches share the idea that policy transfer refers to "the process by which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system" (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000) . Their differences largely lie in scale and method. Whereas the domestic policy transfer literature employs case studies and qualitative methods to identify and examine the processes and interactions which lead one jurisdiction to emulate the policies of another, the policy diffusion literature tends to use large-n quantitative methods to establish the degree of policy convergence, either intentional or driven by structural processes, across large sets of states.
These literatures, including that on dysfunctional policy transfer, do however suffer from being too state-centric in that they maintain that weak states adopt, either by direct coercion or mimicry, damaging policies which are devised by and serve the interests of powerful actors in the international system. While there is a good deal of truth in such claims, our contention is that international organizations themselves are partially autonomous actors in world politics who have interests, agendas and resources which are independent from those of their member states. In particular, an international organization's constant struggle for relevance, issues and resources acts as an incentive for them to develop and disseminate 'weak' standards and regimes which notionally address pressing governance problems but are benign and politically palatable in practise. This dynamic means that international organizations can be agents of dysfunctional transfer quite independently of powerful states 7 in the international system. It is this process which we analyse in the case study of the OECD's promotion of standards designed to improve international tax transparency.
The OECD and Tax Transparency: Triumph or Tragedy?
Created in 1961, the OECD has played a crucial role in the development of the international tax regime. Initially the focus was on promoting its Model Tax Convention, a prototype for negotiating bilateral tax agreements first developed by its predecessor the OEEC in 1958.
More recently the organization and its Centre for Tax Policy and Administration (CTPA) has assumed a wider remit through leading international debate and promoting best practice in relation to an ever expanding range of tax issues (Picciotto 1992 , Woodward 2009 Table 1 ). These concerns assumed a tangible form with the release of the OECD's report Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (OECD 1998). For excellent summaries see : Webb 2004 , Eden and Kudrle 2005 , Sharman 2006 , Rixen 2008 , Palan et al. 2010 . This ambitious initiative aimed to identify tax havens, defined as low or no tax jurisdictions that were unwilling to hold or exchange tax and financial data with overseas tax authorities seeking information concerning the offshore affairs of their residents.
The hope was that identified tax havens would be persuaded to adopt the OECD's standard for information exchange. However if such voluntary compliance did not eventuate then sanctions or other "defensive measures" were threatened (Eccleston 2012, Ch. 3).
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By the mid-2000s the OECD's tax transparency project was floundering amidst steadfast resistance from tax havens within and beyond the OECD, growing reticence from the Bush Administration in the United States, and opposition from the transnational tax planning industry (Webb 2004) . Indeed the agenda which had been launched with such optimism in 1998 was rightly characterised as being the victim of a "politics without conviction" because in order to sustain waning support for the project the OECD was forced to dilute the standard to the point that it was widely regarded as being ineffective (Palan et al. 2010 ). Yet contrary to expectations, over the past five years, the OECD has exploited the global financial crisis to achieve considerable progress in promoting tax transparency, at least insofar as brokering bilateral information exchange agreements including TIEAs and Double Tax Treaties (DTCs) are concerned. Until 2006 a mere 11 OECD TIEAs had been signed, but renewed enthusiasm for tax transparency is such that by mid-2011 659 had been agreed with this number swelling to 1100 TIEA/DTCs by mid-2013 (OECD 2013a, 6 ).
In addition to the proliferation of TIEAs, the G20's April 2009 meeting requested the OECD to "develop an effective peer-review mechanism to assess compliance" and provided dedicated funding to revitalise the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (Global Forum) for this purpose (Porter and Rubio-Vega 2011) . The revised Global Forum was established in September 2009 with members agreeing to important substantive and procedural changes to the regime. First, the Global Forum introduced a more robust, two-staged peer review process designed to establish the extent that Forum members (which numbered 119 states in September 2013) fulfilled their commitments under the emerging tax information exchange regime. Phase one of the peer review process examines the merits of a jurisdiction's legal and regulatory framework for exchanging tax information. If the phase one review finds that a jurisdiction has satisfactory arrangements for tax information exchange arrangements in place, it qualifies for a phase-two review which 9 assesses and assigns a rating to their practical effectiveness. The second phase assessment responds to criticisms of the original OECD regime which measured only whether the requisite frameworks existed, but gave no consideration to whether a jurisdiction would exchange information in practice. Second, the Forum requires members to submit to a postassessment follow-up process to ensure that jurisdictions do not backslide on their commitments and to keep their partners apprised of policy changes which may impair their ability to exchange tax information (OECD 2011b). Finally, the Global Forum has refined the assessment and grading criteria. Previously a jurisdiction was regarded having "substantially implemented" the international standard if it had 12 TIEAs. This emphasis on an arbitrary quantity of agreements rather than their quality and relevance meant a jurisdiction could meet the standard without compromising its offshore business by entering into agreements with obscure states of little economic significance rather than the financial centres on which they rely for investment (Murphy 2010) . Now the Global Forum demanded member jurisdictions to finalise a "network of information exchange agreements..... [with] all relevant partners".
The new assessment regime also moves beyond making a crude distinction between compliant and non-compliant jurisdictions instead evaluating conformity with individual elements of the international standard. As of September 2013, the Global Forum had completed and published 113 peer reviews covering 98 jurisdictions (OECD 2013a). Almost all Global Forum members have undergone a phase-one review, the vast majority of which were found to have satisfactory legal frameworks for tax information exchange and eligible for a phase-two review. The Global Forum intends to have completed the phase-two reviews of 50 jurisdictions and to finalise their ratings at the Global Forum's plenary meeting in November 2013. Clearly the ranking of phase 2 reports and the credibility they confer will be a critical test of the Global Forum's legitimacy. 10 Collectively the G20's endorsement of the OECD's tax transparency agenda, the launch of the revised Global Forum, the rapid spread of both tax information exchange agreements and associated domestic reforms could be interpreted as a case of successful international policy transfer devised and promoted by the OECD. Indeed the Secretary General boasted of the organisation orchestrating a "revolution" in global tax transparency (Gurria 2009 ) and, two years later to declare that 'the era of bank secrecy is over' (OECD 2011a). These conclusions are nevertheless challenged by those who remain sceptical about whether these developments will have any material impact on the international tax evasion denouncing the OECD programme as "a whitewash" (Shaxson 2011 ) whose "creeping futility" (Meizner 2012) serves only to legitimise the activities of tax cheats and the industries that abet them. One criticism in particular stood out, namely that the standard which the OECD promoted until 2013 was likely to be ineffective because it is based on exchanging information "on request" requiring tax authorities to identify the taxpayers and the nature of offshore accounts they are investigating before they can approach their counterparts abroad, precisely the thing that opaque tax structures are designed to obfuscate. This approach derived from compromises made to reassure opponents of the OECD's initial harmful tax proposals that they would not be subjected to so-called "fishing expeditions" and would only be required to provide information relating to specific investigations once "all other means available in its territory" had been exhausted (OECD 2011a). Information exchange on request therefore is only useful in a relatively small number of instances where tax authorities have detailed knowledge of offshore schemes acquired through "whistle blowers" or through amnesties and voluntary disclosure schemes (such as occurred in the recent high profile UBS and LCT cases) (Spencer 2010 , Picciotto 2011 , Meinzer 2012 . Ordinarily tax authorities have very limited precise knowledge of offshore tax evasion as senior tax official from an OECD member state explains: 11 Information exchange by request is very useful when you have a taxpayer who you're pretty certain is involved in evasion through a specific jurisdiction.
Then you can ask for information and you'd be able to get it -I'm confident about that, but that's a small part of the problem because generally you don't know the people who have evaded in the first place and that's why we need automatic exchange of information. Otherwise they have to be in your sights before you can use information exchange on request and a lot of these people are not. They go to great efforts to not to be. (Author interview March 2010).
In these circumstances even a well administered regime providing information exchange on request will only reveal the tip of the iceberg so far as international evasion is concerned. To paraphrase former US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld: information exchange on request will help counter 'the known unknowns' but will do little to reveal 'the unknown unknowns', which arguably represent the greatest problem. Reflecting such concerns proposals for a system of automatic information exchange of tax and banking information between tax authorities started top gather momentum (see below).
Explaining dysfunctional transfer: a fourth pathology?
The above case study can be categorised as an example of dysfunctional policy transfer instigated and implemented by the OECD. Yet the diffusion of TIEAs described above does not strictly conform with the pathologies of policy transfer previously outlined. First, and in contrast to the early years of the initiative in the late 1990s, there is less evidence that implementation has miscarried because of domestic opposition. Indeed the prospect of peer review appears to have convinced the vast majority of offshore jurisdictions to implement the formal legislative and administrative measures required to exchange tax information on request, even in places such as Switzerland where reforms have taken place in the teeth of strident 12 opposition from domestic financial groups for whom banking secrecy remains sacrosanct.
Indeed, the OECD (2013b: 8-10) claims that Global Forum members have implemented over 400 of the 666 recommendations made in adopted phase-one reports. Nor does the tax transparency initiative seem to have yielded a "sham regime" in which standards are developed in response to a pressing governance problem but which major powers intentionally fail to implement because they conflict with the national interest (Drezner 2007: 81-85 Importantly it was the OECD rather than member states or any other actors in the international tax regime that spearheaded efforts to have tax information exchange incorporated into the G20's post-financial crisis international reform agenda. Owing to growing inter-organizational competition the OECD has been seizing agendas and problems to bolster its credibility and to shore up its finances (Carroll and Kellow 2011) . Securing a leading post-financial crisis role alongside other international financial institutions was an ideal way of prosecuting this mission. This was an extremely valuable political resource in late 2008 given the political pressure on the G20 to develop a timely retort to the crisis. In the short term, the OECD was able to exploit this resource advantage to win endorsement for its tax information exchange standard as well as securing additional financial resources to assist with its implementation. It is also important to acknowledge that this outcome was not inevitable but was the product of entrepreneurship by OECD Secretary General Gurria, aided by Jeffrey Owens, then Director of the OECD's CTPA, who pushed the OECD's international tax agenda at successive G7 and then G20 leaders' meetings. In the words of one senior OECD official 'our real impact has been in terms of setting a reform agenda. At the height of the crisis we were able to offer world leaders a considered and coherent course of action' (Author interview September 2009).
The OECD's activism in the international tax arena is broadly consistent with Barnett and Finnemore's account of international organizations acting independently of the states which created them. Similarly, either through agenda setting, supplying expert policy advice or through deeper processes of socialization, international organizations have the capacity to change the normative environment in which they are situated and, with time, the very preferences of states themselves (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 28, Checkel 2005) . This literature tends to stress cases where international organizations have been a force for 'good', with their principled agendas acting as a counterpoint to the instrumental concerns of powerful states. Nevertheless, it also recognizes that international organizations are not immune to the 14 bureaucratic pathologies which afflict all organizations. In their seminal work on the subject Barnett and Finnemore (2004: 37) acknowledge how internal competition within agencies for resources, staff and prestige can lead to organizational inefficiencies, however they give scant consideration to the effects of intensified competition amongst the increasingly dense web of organizations and governance structures which defines the international arena (Yi-Chong and Weller 2004) . Organizational rivalry and competition can potentially improve the quality of global governance but may also result incentive structures which privilege reaching international agreements over the substance and effectiveness of the resulting regime. These are conditions which are conducive to development of weak international standards and dysfunctional policy transfer.
In the case of international tax governance the OECD proposed the benign and widely criticised framework of information exchange on request because it was less likely to attract the opprobrium which would undermine the prospects of successfully reaching an international agreement. In contrast, advocating a new regime based on automatic information exchange would have provoked staunch opposition, not only from traditional tax havens but also from OECD members, not least the United States who responded to domestic opposition to the original tax transparency initiative by threatening to revoke its funding for the OECD (Sharman 2006: 61) . By actively promoting a relatively benign standard for tax information exchange and actively linking it to the post-financial crisis reform agenda the OECD has gained kudos and legitimacy helping to bolster member states' financial commitment to the organization as well as €3 million Euro per annum in project specific, 'part 2' financial support for the Global Forum's ongoing work (Eccleston 2012 ).
In the short-run the OECD's desire to win support for its tax information exchange agenda may have promoted the development and transfer of a weak standard, but this does not mean that the 15 organization can ignore critics who dismiss the standard as being ineffective. Indeed the ongoing viability of an organization such as the OECD is linked to its ability to balance political support for its programs with broader questions of legitimacy. Moreover, when the legitimacy of an important reform agenda is called into question then internal bureaucratic logic of the organization may demand policy change. This dynamic has been evident in the international tax arena over the past two years as the case for automatic information exchange for tax purposes has gained momentum forcing an accommodation on the part of the OECD.
The final section of the paper describes these developments before concluding with an assessment of their theoretical implications.
Organizational learning and legitimacy: The campaign for automatic exchange at the OECD
For all the criticism of its preference for promoting information exchange on request as a "flawed standard" and a "wasted opportunity" (Christensen and Shaxson 2010, Meinzer 2012 FATCA's significance lies in the fact that it requires financial institutions (rather than foreign governments) to automatically provide tax and financial information to US tax authorities on the offshore interests of US tax residents or face a 30% withholding tax on all United States sourced income (Browning 2011) . FACTA has catalysed significant changes in international tax governance. Together the US and 5 EU countries (UK, France, Italy, Spain and Germany) developed a model for the implementation of FATCA which would allow financial institutions to automatically report information to domestic tax authorities who would in turn share the information with the tax authorities in the US. Other countries began to show interest in similar arrangements with the US while the UK applied the FATCA template to negotiate automatic information exchange agreements with its Overseas Territories. In short, FATCA represented a "major step toward encouraging foreign governments to implement automatic exchange, thereby transforming the international financial architecture" (Spencer 2010: 64) . These developments also inspired EU to adopt legislative proposals that would expand the scope of automatic information exchange under the Savings Tax Directive to include dividends, capital gains and account balances. Orthodox approaches would be unperturbed by such developments at the OECD, tracing them to changes external to the organization, especially in the prevailing patterns of power and interest in the international system. Undoubtedly the cumulative impact of civil society campaigns, rival standards being promoted by the UN and key OECD member states has influenced OECD policy prescriptions. Failure to adjust risked the OECD becoming a victim of a "forum shopping" process whereby states that wish to engage in automatic information exchange do so outside established OECD processes and frameworks thus undermining the OECD vis-à-vis its institutional competitors. In sum international organizations must balance the need to win support for their agendas given the financial dividends and power such support confers, with the longer term need to sustain and build legitimacy and a reputation for policy expertise. 18 However, the stress on external drivers of change reveals only part of the story. As with the OECD's post-financial crisis tax activism bureaucratic survival and self-interest were central factors explaining the change. The desire of OECD officials to maintain their position as the expert body for international tax affairs made adjustment to automatic information exchange imperative to retaining those discussions inside OECD. A second dimension to this is that OECD officials are playing a long game. Pal (2012) notes that the OECD often commences work in a particular area by developing relatively anodyne or banal recommendations. These recommendations are nonetheless important because they reflect the fact that these issues have been aired at an international level and catalyze an implementation process. OECD peer reviews start to examine enforcement with the resulting reports used to hone the original principles and develop additional dialogues and toolkits. What appear to be trivial agreements serve like "crampons" enabling OECD to gain purchase on a slippery surface before climbing higher by tackling related problems in the same field (Pal 2012: 138-139) . Singly OECD agreements may be anemic but multiple agreements in a particular area quickly coalesce to become a robust set of rules and the basis for an international regime. The sanguine interpretation of the OECD's promotion of information exchange on request is that it represented a staging post towards a more comprehensive system based on automatic information exchange. Certainly this is an argument advanced by the OECD secretariat both privately and in published reports (Author interview September 2009). Thus, what might first appear to be dysfunctional policy transfer may in fact be part of a deliberate strategy on behalf of international secretariats to reach desired objectives. This dual strategy of allowing and developing resources to support automatic information exchange while insisting that exchange on request is the international standard is best understood as a pragmatic compromise in the face of deep seated political resistance to automatic information exchange. Getting states to the point where exchange of information on request is relatively uncontroversial (seemingly an 19 example of policy dysfunction) may be a necessary intermediate step to securing the ultimate aim of tax transparency through automatic information exchange.
Conclusion: Legitimacy, Power and Organizational Adaptation
This article argues that bureaucratic politics and competition can have a significant influence over the substance of standards promoted by international organizations and the extent to which they are transferred. However the case study also highlights the influence of other factors over both the extent of policy transfer and the role of organizations in influencing policy change. To this extent it is important to assess how criticism of an international standard can undermine the legitimacy of a sponsoring organization and how a wider set of power relations will shape the policy response to such criticism.
The effectiveness of international organizations is largely contingent on their legitimacy, something that is especially true of the OECD given its dependence on peer pressure and other 'soft' modes of governance. Legitimacy is important because international organizations and the governance regimes they promote rely on a degree of voluntary participation in order to be effective. However legitimacy has many dimensions encompassing a wide range of actors. For example, Randall Stone's (2011) recent study of international organizations conceptualizes legitimacy as the ability to gain the consent of participating states. However it can be argued that if the authority and power of organizations such as the OECD depend on their reputation and their claim to technical expertise then their legitimacy among NGOs and policy experts is also significant. So at this level international organizations may be sensitive to an informed and sustained campaign which is critical of the standards they promote. Clearly not all civil society campaigns are effective, witness the sustained yet largely ineffective campaign to reform IMF 20 conditionality provisions during the 1990s and 2000s. Only through an analysis of underlying power dynamics can we begin to understand when international organizations will be responsive to external criticism and when such campaign can be ignored.
There are two broad sets of factors which determine an organization's vulnerability to criticism and protest. As Stone (2011) argues a key factor is the extent to which an organization's agenda is supported by powerful states. If they enjoy this support then poorer countries and weaker states will continue to support the regime as part of the price for maintaining a regulatory structure over which they exert some influence. The second and related factor concerns the extent to which rival organizations offer alternative standards and regimes. If, for example, a coalition of states, NGOs and rival organizations cooperate and develop an alternative regulatory standard then the possibility of 'forum shopping' leaves the original international organization in a vulnerable position unless it actively responds to its critics. The preliminary evidence suggests that this is the situation in which the OECD finds itself in relation to international tax transparency. While proposing a weak standard was a rational response from a bureaucratic perspective, technical criticism of the standard in conjunction with the promotion of automatic information exchange elsewhere started to undermine the legitimacy of the OECD's regime and left it with little alternative other than to endorse a more robust standard grounded in automatic information exchange.
We can draw two tentative conclusions in relation to our broader interest in the role of international organizations in policy transfer. Firstly, we believe the nascent literature on the topic should engage with and learn from the literature of bureaucratic politics and how a combination of organizational self-interest and bureaucratic construction of governance problems provides incentives for an organization to expand, seek resources and prestige. Given that 'success' is often judged in terms of reaching an international agreement rather than its 21 ultimate effectiveness international organizations have an incentive to develop weak or lowest common denominator standards. The result, policies that fail to meet their intended outcomes (in this case reducing tax evasion), is an important but seldom recognized form of dysfunctional policy transfer. Second, such ineffectiveness has the capacity to undermine an international organization's legitimacy pushing these selfsame bureaucrats to push for changes that will protect their newfound resources. The case study presented here demonstrated that the OECD's response to criticisms of its standard cannot be accounted for, as rationalist approaches assume, entirely by changes in underlying power dynamics amongst key states alone but require an understanding of the bureaucratic politics of the organization, an important lesson that future research examining policy transfer initiated or pursued through international agencies would do well to follow.
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